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The problems of control within complex organizations are a direct result of the need to coordinate activities that have been broken down into subunits so that they can be performed by a group of employees. In such organizations, authority is justified on a "rational-legal" basis, and the general pattern of control is through bureaucratic rules. As bearers of authority, rules structure relationships and channel action into conformity with the organizational goals. In addition, rules serve as a means of communication. The directional and boundary functions of rules may become dysfunctional if they are interpreted as minimum standards of performance. Also, rules may cause a means-ends inversion for the organization, leading to unsatisfactory relationships and inflexibility. The means of control are inextricably associated with the structure of the organization. Improvements in organizational effectiveness and need-fulfillment of its members depend upon alterations in the structure of the organization that will facilitate change in the means of control. (DE)

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BUREAUCRACY IN EDUCATION

BY JAMES G. ANDERSON

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE
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Preface

Increasingly, professional activities are being carried on within complex organizations which are bureaucratically organized. These bureaucratically structured institutions in turn exercise a compelling but little understood, and therefore potentially detrimental, influence on these activities and on the professionals involved in them. Robert Presthus has underscored the impact of such organizations thus:

Such organizations are more than mere devices for producing goods and services. They have critical normative consequences. They provide the environment in which most of us spend most of our lives. In their efforts to rationalize human energy they become sensitive and versatile agencies for the control of man's behavior, employing subtle psychological sanctions that evoke desired responses and inculcate consistent patterns of action. In this sense, big organizations are a major disciplinary force in our society. Their influence spills over the boundaries of economic interest or activity into spiritual and intellectual sectors; the accepted values of the organization shape the individual's personality and influence his behavior in extravocational affairs. . . . Big organizations therefore become instruments of socialization, providing physical and moral sustenance for their members and shaping their thought and behavior in countless ways.¹

The universal appeal of the bureaucratic type of administration is evidenced by the variety of diverse institutions—industrial, voluntary, political, educational, religious, and governmental—which have adopted this structure. According to Max Weber,

The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organization. The fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares with other

1. *The Organizational Society* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), pp. 15-16.

organizations exactly as does the machine with the non-mechanical modes of production.

Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal costs—these are raised to the optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic administration, and especially in its monocratic form. As compared with all collegiate, honorific, and avocational forms of administration, trained bureaucracy is superior on all these points. And as far as complicated tasks are concerned, paid bureaucratic work is not only more precise but, in the last analysis, it is often cheaper than even formally unremunerated honorific service.²

Characteristic of bureaucratic administration is the superimposition of systems of authority, status, competence, and communications upon one another and the structuring of administrative offices in a hierarchical order. These systems create a distinctive social structure and psychological climate conducive to highly predictable behavior by individuals who constitute the administrative staff.

Within these organizations the problem of control is a direct outgrowth of the need to coordinate the activities of functionally differentiated subunits. Maintenance of a stable means of accomplishing goals in a changing environment requires an organizational structure that facilitates decisions concerning the activities of individuals and subunits pursuing independent goals. The administrative staff of an organization may resort to one or a combination of methods of control over its individual members. These are direct supervision, extensive professional training, performance measures, and rules.

Most compelling of all of the administrative mechanisms used to control individual behavior is the formal authority which is articulated through a body of bureaucratic rules. These rules, important structural variables within the organization, are used extensively to direct and control actions of subordinates by making explicit approved attitudes and behavior. They also impersonalize and make legitimate the exercise of authority by superiors and protect the organization and its members from outside influences which

2. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 214.

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might prove inimical to the organizational endeavor. In short, rules become the bearers of organizational authority for the institution.

However, in attempting to structure and impersonalize relationships so as to minimize the influence of the individual on the accomplishment of organizational goals, the groundwork is laid for dysfunction. These unanticipated consequences include alienation of highly trained professionals; undue emphasis on procedural matters and creation of a certain resistance to change; distortion of the professional-client relationship, with a resultant tendency to treat the public served in a formal, impersonal manner; development of a legalistic attitude toward the performance of official duties, avoidance of responsibility, and minimization of commitment to and involvement in the organizational endeavor; and the appearance of informal groups which attempt to influence policy within the organization. Traditionally, many of these dysfunctional elements have been viewed as direct outgrowths of the attempt to delineate authority and responsibility inherent in individual offices and to impersonalize relationships between members of the organization through a body of rules. The exposition in Chapter I of patterns of control and their consequences for organizations is the point of departure for subsequent chapters.

Much of the theory of the operation of bureaucratic constraints and their impact on members of organizations has not been substantiated empirically. Moreover, educational research has for the most part ignored the methodological advances that have taken place in the social sciences over the last two decades. In particular, survey research techniques are little understood and much maligned by those undertaking research in education despite their application to a wide range of empirical problems in the social sciences.³ This study, which examines in detail the growth, functioning, and consequences of bureaucratic rules within the public schools, illustrates the analytical techniques that have been developed to analyze survey data. The design of the survey, the sampling techniques used, and the construction of scales and indices for

3. For a review of the application of survey research in sociology, political science, psychology, economics, anthropology, education, social work, and public health, see Charles Y. Glock (ed.), *Survey Research in the Social Sciences* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1967).

many of the concepts discussed in the first chapter are described in detail in Chapter II.

In Chapter III the causes of bureaucratization and the consequent reliance on bureaucratic rules, to the detriment of professional expectations of autonomy, judgment, and individual responsibility, are examined. The findings suggest that rules are called upon to perform a number of diverse functions for the institution. They would appear to obviate the necessity for close supervision by providing administrators with an alternative means of directing and controlling the efforts of subordinates who are viewed as less competent, less experienced, or less committed to the organization than themselves. However, the extent to which bureaucratic rules are used in lieu of direct supervision, performance measures, or professional training appears to be highly dependent upon the nature of the professional service performed, the size of the organization, and the relationship established with the public served.

In the schools studied, control of instruction as exercised by rules appears to be affected by variables at four distinct organizational levels. Control of instruction is centralized in schools a substantial portion of whose student body comes from lower-class homes. Where the school's authority may be challenged and its competence questioned, as it has been in dealing with children from impoverished neighborhoods, rules may be called upon to perform a protective function. Also, school administrators may resort to rules in an attempt to ensure that the students attain some minimum level of accomplishment. At the organizational level, size appears to affect the complexity of the organization's structure, resulting in increased procedural specification through rules. Within departments the extent to which control is exercised over instruction is a function of the subject matter taught, the number of faculty members, and the proportion of female teachers in the department. Finally, the degree to which individual teachers are permitted to exercise discretion in instructional matters is directly related to their sex, tenure status, and teaching experience.

By far the most critical dilemma posed for the organization is how to reconcile the expectations of autonomy and individual

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responsibility of highly trained professionals with the bureaucratic hierarchy's demand for centralized control. With more and more professionals working within bureaucratic settings, increased attention is being paid to the conflict which occurs between organizational demands and professional training and expectations.

Within highly structured bureaucratic institutions the role of the professional is drastically altered. Coming to the institution with expectations of independence and professional autonomy, he is required to conform to rules and operating procedures and to defer to hierarchical authority. Since the distribution of status, income, and other rewards is jealously monopolized by individuals high in the hierarchy, professionals may abandon their original orientation for a bureaucratic one which will be rewarded.

In Chapter IV the role played by bureaucratic rules in the conflict between bureaucratic authority and professional autonomy is examined in depth. Contrary to expectations, rules appear to mediate authority conflict, making the imposition of hierarchical authority more tolerable to professionals. By structuring relationships between superiors and subordinates and communicating to professionals what is expected of them, rules impersonalize the exercise of authority and reduce anxiety among members of the organization. In education rules may be particularly necessary because of the lack of accepted performance measures, difficulty in effectively supervising instruction, and varying degrees of professional competence among teachers trained in the various disciplines.

Of even greater interest are the findings concerning the effect of bureaucracy in the educational process reported in Chapter V. Analyses of data from junior high schools suggest that the impersonal treatment of students by teachers and teacher resistance to new instructional approaches may be unanticipated consequences of the socialization of new teachers who aspire to tenure and a career in the public school system. Both reactions may very well be the result of the present practice of requiring new teachers to serve a probationary period under the supervision of subject matter specialists.

Moreover, school size may affect instructional practices in a detrimental fashion. As schools enroll larger and larger numbers of

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students, thus requiring enlarged instructional and administrative staffs, increased specialization results. Teachers are assigned to teach specific subjects at specific grade levels, often to students of about the same ability and background. Departmental duties are centralized and assigned to a department head responsible for supervising instruction. Extracurricular assignments are made. For many teachers such specification and specialization may destroy the meaning of teaching and render their jobs devoid of interest or challenge.

Finally, teachers in lower-class schools, who deal with children from a wide range of cultural backgrounds and abilities, attempt to personalize their teaching to a greater extent than their colleagues in middle-class schools. In middle-class schools the students' similar background and ability may lead to a more impersonal and traditional style of instruction aimed at the hypothetical average. The heterogeneous student body found in lower-class schools may encourage teachers to look for new approaches and new techniques.

The impact of variables at four levels of the organization—environmental, organizational, departmental, and individual—on the choice of means of control and the impact that such constraints have on members of the organization are re-examined in Chapter VI. The school's clientele—students and their parents—is viewed as having a dynamic effect on its authority structure as well as on instruction. In lower-class neighborhoods increased instructional prescription through rules results from administrators' attempts to protect the school against disruptive outside influences. Moreover, centralization of authority in instructional matters appears to be an effort to offset the affective relationships that such teachers establish with their students. In an attempt to prevent teachers from departing too far from universal norms and policies regarding instruction, school administrators seem to resort to the imposition of rules. The result is increased conflict with authority on the part of teachers, as manifested by dissatisfaction with administrative practices and increased sentiment in favor of unionization.

Another important factor that influences control in the schools is the ambiguous and esoteric nature of educational objectives in

the more academic subjects, which makes it difficult to determine the extent to which these objectives are attained by individual teachers. Lack of agreement on educational goals in certain subjects, then, may lead to increased specification of curricula and instructional techniques through rules.

Finally, it is suggested here that because of the perpetuation of the myth of equality between teachers and administrators, a myth strongly championed by the NEA-affiliated professional associations, and the failure to recognize the authority relationship that actually obtains between teachers and administrators, educational institutions have had recourse to ever more bureaucratic patterns of control. The advantages of utilizing alternative forms of control have been largely denied educational administrators.

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as an article entitled "The Teacher: Bureaucrat or Professional?" in volume 3 (Fall, 1967). I am grateful to the editors of the *Quarterly* for permission to reprint these selections here.

J. G. A.

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Contents

Preface	vii
Acknowledgments	xv
Figures	xix
✓ I. Patterns of Control and Their Consequences in Formal Organizations	1
The Problem of Control in Formal Organizations	1
Consequences of Control	5
Patterns of Control	10
Supervision	10
Impersonal Mechanisms	12
Professional Standards	14
Bureaucratic Rules	16
Rules as Bearers of Organizational Authority	17
Rules as Mediators of Authority Relationships	24
Rules and the Preservation of Organizational Autonomy ...	34
Summary	37
II. Survey Design, Sampling, and Scaling	40
Introduction	40
Survey Design	43
Sampling	44
Stratum I: Junior High Schools	47
Stratum II: Departments	48
Stratum III: Teachers	49
Scaling	49
Scale and Index Construction	49
Variables and Attributes	53
Reliability	73
Validity	76

Figures

1	The Janus-Like Character of Bureaucratic Rules	39
2	Scale and Index Construction	52
3	Relationship between Level of Rules and Size of Department, Controlling for Socioeconomic Level of Student Body	85
4	Rules Scores for English, Science, and Industrial Arts Departments, Controlling for Socioeconomic Level of Student Body and Size of School: Medium-Size Schools (500-1,500 Students)	86
5	Percentages of Male and Female Teachers Subject to Low, Medium, and High Levels of Departmental Rules	89
6	Relationship between Rules and Proportion of Female Teachers in English and Science Departments	90
7	Rules Scores for English, Science, and Industrial Arts Departments in Eight Junior High Schools	92
8	Rules Scores for English, Science, and Industrial Arts Departments, Controlling for Size of Department	93
9	Relationship between Teachers' Tenure Status and Departmental Rules	96
10	Relationship between Teachers' Tenure Status and Departmental Rules: Components of Chi Square	98
11	Relationship between Teachers' Tenure Status and Departmental Rules, Controlling for Socioeconomic Level of Student Body	100
12	Relationship between Teaching Experience and Departmental Rules	102

11

I

Patterns of Control and Their Consequences in Formal Organizations

THE PROBLEM OF CONTROL IN FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS

All organizations, and I might add, parenthetically, all social systems, develop a structure and mechanism to provide for their maintenance and continuity.¹ Because organizations produce goods or services that are consumed by society, a structure must be established that permits the organization to identify social needs accurately, translate them into organizational objectives, and mobilize resources for their production.² The resources utilized in the attainment of goals are the factors of production, land, labor, and capital. In order to attain these goals, the organization first must secure the necessary psychological and material support from a society filled with competitors. Of paramount importance is the recruitment and retention of personnel, and much of its energy will be directed toward this end.

Within complex organizations the problem of control is a direct result of the need to coordinate activities that have been broken down into sub-units so that they can be performed by a group of employees. Each member of the organization occupies a position created by this role differentiation or division of labor and interacts with individuals occupying other positions. Out of the attempt to differentiate and integrate the activities of subunits and

1. The article by Philip Selznick, "Foundations of the Theory of Organization" (*American Sociological Review*, 13 [February, 1948]:25-35), provides a good example of the application of functional analysis to organizations.

2. John Walton (*Administration and Policy-Making in Education* [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959]) has defined the functions of administration in educational institutions as determination of organizational purpose, direction of the organization's activities to accomplish this purpose, and provision for the organization's survival.

individuals in the attainment of organizational goals, quite distinct rational and social structures emerge.

Maintenance of a stable mechanism for accomplishing these goals in a changing environment requires an organizational structure that permits independent action by participants and subunits in pursuit of their goals.³ Max Weber, in his treatment of the sociology of organizations, or, as he calls them, "corporate organization," conceives of this structure as one of roles or positions in which authority is institutionalized. Authority in this case is attached to particular offices within the organization, and not to the individual occupying the office. It is institutionalized by rigid specification and articulated through rules, regulations, codes, norms, and standards. "Orders" are given and must be carried out, which requires an administrative staff.

For Weber the distinguishing feature of an organization is the nature of its claim to legitimate authority. Authority must be legitimated if officials are to have a clearly defined status and are to be accepted by those whom they must control. However, this legitimation is dependent upon the environment in which the organization functions.⁴

One type of institutional authority is "charismatic." The leader is a revolutionary figure upsetting the institutional order. His followers are willing to accept his authority because of a belief in his extraordinary powers, which must be demonstrated from time to time. The administrative staff functions as a body of disciples with each person assigned a particular role by the leader. There are no limitations to the "official's" authority, and no member has any fixed status except that which the leader gives him. According to Weber, this type of institution is unstable and cannot become the basis of a permanent order without major changes in its administrative structure. A process that Weber calls "routinization of

3. Jean Hills has pointed out ("Some Comments on James G. Anderson's Bureaucratic Rules—Bearers of Organizational Authority," *Educational Administration Quarterly*, 2 [Autumn, 1966]:243-61) that units of an organization specializing in goal attainment must have the right to make decisions binding upon participants in order to mobilize organizational resources in accomplishing its goals. This leads to the hierarchical structure of bureaucracy.

4. Much of this discussion of Weber's concept of institutional authority is taken from the Introduction to *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons [New York: Oxford University Press, 1947]), pp. 56-77.

charisma" ultimately transforms the structure of the organization into that of either the "traditional" type or the "rational-legal" type.⁵

The "traditional" type of institutionalized authority rests upon a body of traditions which are accepted as though they had always existed. The leader and administrative officials exercise authority and achieve a certain status by virtue of these traditions. However, there is no clear distinction between the authority vested in the office and that commanded by the individual occupying it. As long as the incumbent does not violate tradition, he can arbitrarily extend his authority to matters not originally included in his jurisdiction. This system of authority is susceptible to appropriation of the "means of administration" and remuneration by the incumbent. Such appropriations become part of the tradition handed down from generation to generation as the system of authority becomes interwoven with the social system in which the organization operates.⁶

In the "rational-legal" type of authority a system of general rules circumscribes the conduct of officials. In a sense, such rules are universalistic and impersonal and apply to all persons who fall within their jurisdiction. There is a complete separation of the administrative official's function from his personal life. His authority and administrative control extend only to matters pertaining to his office, and even there he is limited to a "sphere of competence" and his jurisdiction is carefully defined.⁷ In this case the administrative staff takes the form of a "bureaucratic" structure which functions, according to Weber, in the following manner:

1. They are personally free and subject to authority only with respect to their impersonal official obligations.
2. They are organized in a clearly defined hierarchy of offices.
3. Each office has a clearly defined sphere of competence in the legal sense.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 358-73. For another rendering of Weber's ideas about the characteristics of a bureaucracy and the functions of its officials, see *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 245-52.

6. *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, pp. 341-58.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 329-41. Also see *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, pp. 196-244.

4. The office is filled by a free contractual relationship. Thus in principle, there is free selection.

5. Candidates are selected on the basis of technical qualifications. In the most rational case, this is tested by examination or guaranteed by diplomas certifying technical training, or both. They are *appointed*, not elected.

6. They are remunerated by fixed salaries in money, for the most part with a right to pensions. Only under certain circumstances does the employing authority, especially in private organizations, have a right to terminate the appointment, but the official is always free to resign. The salary scale is primarily graded according to rank in the hierarchy; but in addition to this criterion, the responsibility of the position and the requirements of the incumbent's social status may be taken into account.

7. The office is treated as the sole, or at least the primary, occupation of the incumbent.

8. It constitutes a career. There is a system of "promotion" according to seniority or to achievement, or both. Promotion is dependent on the judgment of superiors.

9. The official works entirely separated from ownership of the means of administration and without appropriation of his position.

10. He is subject to strict and systematic discipline and control in the conduct of the office.⁸

Weber provides examples of the applicability of this type of administration to a variety of institutions pursuing both material and ideological goals, such as business, voluntary, political, religious, and governmental bodies. According to Weber, the major reason for bureaucracy's superior adaptability to such varying purposes is its great efficiency, efficiency stemming from the highly rational nature of the structure, in which officials function on the basis of technical knowledge necessary in the performance of their specialized duties. Factual, objective standards of judgment and of performance are used by superiors. Impersonal, rational standards are used in recruiting, promoting, disciplining, and controlling members of the organization.

An administrative staff functioning according to these bureaucratic criteria permits a high degree of predictability within the organization. There is a specific delineation of authority and re-

8. *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, pp. 333-34. See also *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, pp. 196-204.

sponsibility for each office. Relationships between offices are formalized. Impersonality pervades the structure, so that individuals have little personal influence on the conduct of the duties of the office.⁹ This formal authority is buttressed by the allocation of status and organizational rewards. These include income, deference, responsibility, titles, privileges, access to information, and other perquisites of office.¹⁰

Perhaps the main purpose of this status system and unequal distribution of rewards is to provide members of the organization with cues to appropriate behavior in the interpersonal exchanges that take place. As such, the status system reinforces the hierarchy of authority that exists within the organization by defining superior and subordinate roles.¹¹ Moreover, the status system enhances motivation as well as acceptance of authority. Status and prestige are highly valued. The higher one ascends within the organization, the greater one's share of the status and rewards it offers, and thus there is a tendency for individuals to identify closely with the organization's values and goals.¹² At the same time, the individual's stake in the preservation of a social system that offers desirable rewards results in the enforcement of institutionalized authority not only by superiors but by everyone. Such social sanctions to a large extent render organizational sanctions unnecessary.¹³

CONSEQUENCES OF CONTROL

Despite attempts within complex organizations to structure and impersonalize relationships so that individuals will have little or no

9. See Robert Dubin, "The Efficiency of Bureaucratic Administration," *Human Relations in Administration*, ed. Robert Dubin (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1951), pp. 161-62.

10. See Chester I. Barnard, "Functions and Pathology of Status Systems in Formal Organizations," in *Industry and Society*, ed. William Foote Whyte (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1946), pp. 46-83.

11. See Robert Presthus, *The Organizational Society* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), pp. 36-37.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 155.

13. For an extended discussion of this notion of acceptance of authority as social system, see James G. Anderson, "The Authority Structure of the School: System of Social Exchange," *Educational Administration Quarterly*, 3 (Spring, 1967):130-48; Peter M. Blau, *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964), pp. 200, 207-9.

effect on the accomplishment of organizational goals, no organization can be completely rational.¹⁴ In the first place, its members bring with them diverse experiences, training, and attitudes. They can and do interact outside of the system of formally assigned roles. Secondly, the formal and informal structures of the organization are affected by pressure from the environment in which it is placed. Thirdly, the historical perspective within which persons both within and without the organization regard its goals and the methods used to reach them have a decided effect upon the organization itself.

The structuring of the organization involves delegation of authority and delineation of responsibility and jurisdiction of each role within the organization. However, even Weber, in his initial formulation of the characteristics of a bureaucracy, seems to have realized that although the rational-legal system of authority institutionalized in modern bureaucracy is the most efficient and rational form of administration, it is also the most unstable. Talcott Parsons has observed rather cogently that

a system of rational-legal authority can only operate through imposing and enforcing with relative efficiency, seriously frustrating limits on many important human interests, interests which either operate independently of particular institutions, in any society, or are generated by the strains inherent in the particular structure itself. One source of such strain is the segregation of roles, and of the corresponding authority to use influence over others and over non-human resources, which is inherent in the functionally limited sphere of office. There are always tendencies to stretch the sanctioned limits of official authority to take in ranges of otherwise "personal" interests. In other words this form of institutionalization involves a kind of "abstraction" of a part of the human individual from the concrete whole which is in a certain sense "unreal" and hence can only be maintained by continual discipline.¹⁵

Furthermore, members of the organization are assigned particular specified and impersonalized roles. Authority is delegated to the roles themselves and not to the individual fulfilling them. However, to carry out the functions of the office a functionary,

14. This idea is touched upon in Reinhard Bendix, "Bureaucracy: The Problem and Its Setting," *American Sociological Review*, 12 (October, 1947):493-507.

15. Parsons, Introduction to Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, p. 68.

whose needs, goals, and past experiences may not coincide with those of the organization, is necessarily involved. The degree to which his goals do coincide with those of the organization will determine whether or not he will reinforce the formal goals or abridge them. This potential deviation from the formal structure of the organization tends to weaken it as an effective determinant of behavior.¹⁶

The institution, to be effective, must weigh acquiescence and individual initiative.¹⁷ Strict adherence to organizational rules by the employee must be tempered by discretion in performing his duties. The organization must rely to some degree upon the individual's comprehension of his function and the insight that he gains through experience in performing it. Thus, one of the major challenges to a bureaucracy is somehow to maintain an orientation midway between rigid adherence to formal rules and unlimited exercise of discretion.

The conflict between a rational system based on technical competence and expertise and a social system which demands loyalty to the organization and to its subunits is reflected in tension in all aspects of the organization's activities.¹⁸ Such conflict is evident in the dispute over whether employees are to be promoted on the basis of seniority, often used as an index of loyalty, or on the basis of professional competence, which administrators find difficult to evaluate. Two cases in point are the familiar arguments against merit pay plans for public school teachers, on the grounds that it is impossible to measure teacher effectiveness, and college professors' use of job offers from other institutions to bargain for higher salaries. The dilemma of differentiation versus integration is manifested in the problem of recruiting new members for the organization. William H. Whyte¹⁹ and

16. For an excellent discussion of this truncation of the formal organizational structure, see Selznick, "Foundations of the Theory of Organization."

17. The need for a balance between compliance and initiative in bureaucratic conduct is discussed by Bendix ("Bureaucracy," pp. 502-7).

18. For a good discussion of this tension in organizations, see Alvin W. Gouldner, "Organizational Analysis," in *Sociology Today*, ed. Robert K. Merton, Leonard Broom, and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr. (New York: Basic Books, 1959), pp. 400-28.

19. William H. Whyte, Jr., *The Organization Man* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955).

David Riesman,²⁰ in their analyses of this dilemma in our society, suggest that organizations often forgo professional expertise for the sake of personalities that will function harmoniously with others. Goodwin Watson concludes that much of the mediocrity in academic institutions is the result of this sort of pseudo-teamwork, which acts as a substitute for creativity.²¹

Another focal point for tension is the relationship that exists between the professionals and their clients. Peter Blau's study of a state employment agency²² illustrates the dilemma often faced by professionals in organizations. Conflict between the professional and bureaucratic roles of case workers occurred when the worker interviewing a client decided that he was not qualified for any available job or when the worker was compelled to refer a client to an employer against his own judgment. A favorite way of dispelling tension and guilt feelings among the staff was to seek, in informal discussions, approbation of colleagues for such actions. A study of the relationships between government officials and recent immigrants to Israel²³ also illustrates this problem. In many instances government instructors sent to immigrant communities became spokesmen for the villages, presenting the demands of the immigrants to the very agencies which they represented.

Probably the greatest tension arises when administrators attempt to supervise and to control subordinates whose technical competence differs significantly from their own. Because administrators of formal organizations are increasingly dependent upon highly skilled professionals, one of the most typical characteristics of modern organizations is conflict between authority of position and authority generated by professional competence and expertise.²⁴ This problem is further aggravated by the expert's identifi-

20. David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1950).

21. Goodwin Watson, "The Problem of Bureaucracy, a Summary," *Journal of Social Issues*, 1 (December, 1945):69-72.

22. Peter M. Blau, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), pp. 82-96.

23. Elihu Katz and S. N. Eisenstadt, "Some Sociological Observations on the Response of Israeli Organizations to New Immigrants," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 5 (1960):113-33.

24. This is the major thesis of Victor Thompson's work, *Modern Organization* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964).

cation with a professional group rather than with his organization. Rather than being received by delegation, as is that of executives and administrators, his authority is based on competence in a particular field, and such competence can only be judged by his professional colleagues.

These differing ways of validating authority have important consequences for the organization.²⁵ They affect the individual's loyalty to the institution, his acceptance of rules and regulations, and the direction of his professional efforts. For example, in his study of a small private liberal arts college, Alvin W. Gouldner identified two groups among the faculty.²⁶ One group, which he called "cosmopolitans," was oriented toward its professional organizations. Its members' chief goal was eminence in their own subject areas. The second group, called "locals," endorsed the values of the institution, and its chief goal was stature within the institution. In general, members of this group did not share the first group's identification with national professional organizations.

Theodore Caplow and Reece McGee sum up the problem faced by institutions of higher education in recruiting new faculty as follows: "Today a scholar's orientation to his institution is apt to disorient him to his discipline and to affect professional prestige unfavorably. Conversely, an orientation to his discipline will disorient him to his institution, which he will regard as a temporary shelter where he can pursue his career as a member of the discipline."²⁷ Blau and Scott's study of a welfare agency also reported that those welfare workers who identified most closely with their profession were the most critical of the agency's policies and operation.²⁸ All of these studies document vividly the tension

25. Walter I. Wardwell ("Social Integration, Bureaucratization and the Professions," *Social Forces*, 33 [May, 1955]:356-59) identifies three types of occupational roles, namely, professional roles involving a high degree of specialization, executive roles involving responsibility for coordinating activities, and labor roles involving neither specialization nor coordination.

26. Alvin W. Gouldner, "Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 2 (1957-58):281-306, 444-80.

27. Theodore Caplow and Reece J. McGee, *The Academic Marketplace* (New York: Basic Books, 1958), p. 85.

28. Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, *Formal Organizations* (San Francisco, Calif.: Chandler Publishing Co., 1962), pp. 66-74.

that exists within organizations between the rational system, which is highly dependent upon professional expertise and competence, and the social system, which relies on institutional loyalty.

PATTERNS OF CONTROL

The actual choice as to means of controlling the behavior of members of the organization, however, must still be resolved in each case. Dorwin Cartwright has suggested²⁹ that such a determination depends upon expectations of the effectiveness of the means of control and of its probable consequences for the organization, ethical imperatives and legal constraints, and the relative positions occupied by the individuals concerned within the social framework of the organization. The administrative body of an organization may resort to one or a combination of mechanisms to control and coordinate its functionally interdependent parts (subunits or individuals). Each of these mechanisms poses its particular problems.

Supervision

One of the traditional means of controlling employees is by direct supervision of their actions. However, the problem confronting a supervisor is the need to extend his control over his subordinates beyond the limits of contractual obligations and of the formal authority relegated to him. One strategy is to use formal sanctions or threats of sanctions. A number of studies³⁰ have demonstrated, however, that such an authoritarian style inhibits satisfaction and productivity.

A second strategy involves a form of social exchange.³¹ Supervisors occupy strategic positions from which they can influence

29. Dorwin Cartwright, "Influence, Leadership, Control," in *Handbook of Organizations*, ed. James G. March (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1965), pp. 1-47.

30. See, for example, Robert L. Kahn and Daniel Katz, "Leadership Practices in Relation to Productivity and Morale," in *Group Dynamics*, ed. Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), pp. 554-70; Michael Argyle *et al.*, "Supervisory Methods Related to Productivity, Absenteeism, and Labor Turnover," *Human Relations*, 11 (1958):23-40.

31. See Anderson, "The Authority Structure of the School," and Blau, *Exchange and Power in Social Life*, pp. 200, 207-9.

the distribution of scarce rewards, such as the scheduling of vacations and days off, opportunities to work overtime, job assignments, etc. Moreover, by assisting their subordinates in the performance of their jobs and supporting them in interdepartmental disputes or in the presentation of grievances, they create social obligations among them.

In this fashion coordination and supervision of group activities involves social credit. Employees are willing to comply with supervisory demands in excess of their obligations with the expectation of a reward at some later date. If the supervisor is effective in securing greater rewards for them than would have been obtained otherwise, this success buttresses his claims to compliance in the future. In effect, it establishes credit which the supervisor can draw upon at will.

The collective obligation that is incurred by supervisory actions and group approval of the exchange of compliance and services creates group pressure for compliance with institutional authority. To a large extent such social sanctions obviate the necessity for organizational sanctions. A number of empirical studies support this contention. For example, John French and Richard Snyder's study³² demonstrates that superiors who are liked and respected by their subordinates attempt to influence them more frequently, and are more successful, than unpopular superiors.

The danger is that the effectiveness of supervision may be compromised by the relationships and expectations that develop between a superior and his subordinates. Gouldner's study of managerial failure in a gypsum firm³³ bears this out. Ultimately, this organization resorted to more stringent controls to counteract the effect of an indulgent manager. Donald C. Pelz's research³⁴ amplifies another dilemma facing the supervisor, namely, the problem of remaining somewhat independent of pressure from superiors as well as from subordinates. The most effective supervisors were

32. John R. P. French, Jr., and Richard Snyder, "Leadership and Interpersonal Power," in *Studies in Social Power*, ed. Dorwin Cartwright (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1959), pp. 118-49.

33. Alvin W. Gouldner, *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954), pp. 45-56.

34. Donald C. Pelz, "Influence: A Key to Effective Leadership in the First Line Supervisor," *Personnel*, 29 (1952): 209-17.

found to be more nearly autonomous in the performance of their supervisory duties than supervisors who themselves were subject to close supervision. Supervisors, then, are indeed men in the middle, subject to pressure from above and below that may easily vitiate their effectiveness.

Impersonal Mechanisms

Within organizations it is typical for orders to be passed down through the hierarchy, ultimately reaching the individual who will carry them out. Obedience is ensured by direct supervision of the worker. However, this practice impedes performance in many instances, as we have seen.

Rather than resorting to direct supervision, management may set up impersonal mechanisms of control over subordinates. One of the earliest examples of this type of impersonal control is the assembly line. Since the task performed by workers and the sequence and timing of operations are all programmed in advance, the foreman is cast in a new role, that of trouble shooter. Instead of supervising the worker's performance, the foreman assists him whenever problems arise that might disrupt the production schedule. With the assembly line assuring the desired performance, there is no longer a need for direct supervision. In effect, the flow of demand is reversed, with workers calling upon the foreman for assistance.³⁵

Performance records offer management still another means of controlling behavior through an impersonal mechanism that avoids the conflict inherent in close supervision. Statistical records were used as a means of controlling employees in the state employment agency studied by Blau.³⁶ Once introduced, public performance records provided employees with an indication of how their work compared with that of others in the agency involved in similar activities. As a consequence of this practice, however, acute competition developed that inhibited the productivity of the

35. See Charles R. Walker and Robert H. Guest, *The Man on the Assembly Line* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952); and Charles R. Walker *et al.*, *The Foreman on the Assembly Line* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956).

36. Blau, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy*, pp. 33-48.

group as a whole. Moreover, the performance measures heavily emphasized the quantity of interviews conducted, thus motivating workers to spend more time completing interviews than attempting to find jobs for their clients. Chris Argyris reports a similar distortion in business operations due to the imposition of a quota system.³⁷ At the end of the month employees would select easy jobs in order to fill their quotas. This practice inevitably led to delays in filling some customers' orders.

A particularly ingenious long-range control mechanism was reported by Herbert Kaufman in his study of the United States Forest Service.³⁸ In the Service centralized control is difficult because of the remote locations of many units. Control is maintained by requiring each ranger to compile and submit a detailed diary covering his daily activities, recorded every half hour. These records are then meticulously examined by the regional headquarters staff. This diary, along with other reports, observations of field visits, and a system of frequent transfers, constitutes a rather effective control device.

Despite their differences, all these impersonal control mechanisms have essentially the same consequences. They provide an alternative to close supervision and reverse the flow of demand within the organization. In so doing they restructure the relationships between the supervisor and his subordinates. The supervisor can permit employees to come to him when problems arise. Moreover, because the subordinate is provided with a measure of his own performance, performance records permit management to allow him more discretion in his work. On the other hand, as has been observed, these measures may inadvertently impede the attainment of certain desirable organizational objectives, as illustrated in the case of the state employment agency.³⁹

37. Chris Argyris, *The Impact of Budgets on People* (New York: Controllershship Foundation, School of Business and Public Administration, Cornell University, 1952).

38. Herbert Kaufman, *The Forest Ranger: A Study in Administrative Behavior* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1960).

39. See V. F. Ridgway, "Dysfunctional Consequences of Performance Measurements," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1 (1956-57):240-47.

Professional Standards

Organizations may rely upon professional associations and upon norms and standards internalized by individuals during an extensive period of professional training as a means of shaping institutional behavior. In this instance the actions of individuals are governed by standards and principles which are applied to particular cases. Mastery of the requisite skill and knowledge requires an extended period of specialized training. Performance is judged by colleagues. A code of professional ethics protects the client and the institution served from self-interest, emotional involvement, and malfeasance. Failure to abide by this code results in sanctions of colleagues, who have a vested interest in upholding the integrity and prestige of the profession. To enforce these standards professional associations attempt to pre-empt the legal licensing of practitioners.⁴⁰

Clearly, this form of social control, based on self-imposed professional standards and surveillance by colleagues, differs markedly from the others described. Authority is highly dispersed at all levels of the organization rather than being centralized and gradated in a hierarchical structure, as in the military. Amitai Etzioni has noted that in certain types of organizations this type of authority structure obtains almost exclusively.⁴¹ He observes that in universities, hospitals, and research organizations such as the RAND Corporation substantive activities are planned and carried out by professionals. For example, university professors decide upon the research they will undertake and, to a large extent, what they will teach. The main function of administrative staffs in these institutions is to support such activities, thus reversing the traditional line and staff roles.

Physical separation of individuals and units within an organization, which makes supervision difficult and costly, may also result in an increased dependence upon the discretion of the individual.

40. See Blau and Scott, *Formal Organizations*, pp. 60-63, for a good comparison of professional and bureaucratic orientation.

41. Amitai Etzioni, "Authority Structure and Organizational Effectiveness," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 4 (1959):43-67.

Everett C. Hughes points out the increased responsibility accorded nurses as a result of episodic supervision by physicians.⁴²

A study by Arthur Stinchcombe⁴³ contrasts control of workers in construction industries with that in mass production industries. He found that in mass production industries an elaborate hierarchical structure is set up to plan and supervise the work, while construction industries have only a rudimentary administrative staff. Instead, reliance is placed upon standards of craftsmanship, since the workers are to a large extent skilled artisans. Although such autonomy is seemingly an ideal means of controlling the behavior of highly skilled members of an organization, a study by Donald Pelz and Frank M. Andrews⁴⁴ indicates that too much autonomy may result in the withdrawal of experts from the stimulation of professional colleagues, which appears necessary to enhance their performance. In a study of scientists in research and development agencies Pelz and Andrews found that a positive relationship between autonomy and performance obtained only at an intermediate level. The performance of scientists subject to tight control or, at the opposite extreme, to virtually no control, was only average or below average.

Moreover, role ambiguity is costly for the individual and for the organization in other ways, as demonstrated by Robert L. Kahn and his associates.⁴⁵ They perceive role ambiguity as existing when an individual lacks information concerning his job, its goals, means of accomplishing these goals, means of accomplishing his own personal goals, and his standing with his colleagues. Their national study of managerial roles in business and industry demonstrates that role ambiguity is widespread in organizations and results in anxiety, dissatisfaction, feelings of futility, and mistrust of associates.

All of the patterns of organizational control discussed thus far have two characteristics in common: each regulates, restricts, and

42. Everett C. Hughes, *Men and Their Work* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958), p. 74.

43. Arthur C. Stinchcombe, "Bureaucratic and Craft Administration of Production: A Comparative Study," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 4 (1959): 168-87.

44. Donald C. Pelz and Frank M. Andrews, "Autonomy, Coordination, and Stimulation in Relation to Scientific Achievement," *Behavioral Science*, 11 (March, 1966): 89-97.

45. Robert L. Kahn et al., *Organizational Stress: Studies in Role Conflict and Ambiguity* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964), pp. 72-95.

controls behavior. At the same time, as we have seen, each has certain more or less serious undesirable consequences for the organization.

Bureaucratic Rules

In addition to the control strategies already outlined, organizations may rely upon rules that explicitly or implicitly prescribe or proscribe behavior. Rules constitute a rather compelling means of controlling organizationally relevant behavior and are used to some extent in almost every organization and institution. This ubiquitous use of rules results, first, from the role that they play in integrating and structuring a stable social system capable of mobilizing resources to accomplish specific goals. Second, they provide a means of preserving the functional autonomy of an organization in a constantly changing environment of competing and conflicting organizations and social institutions.

Rules may be used to perform the first of these roles by directing behavior, especially in instances in which it is impossible or undesirable to resort to one of the other means of control. Moreover, rules may be effective in ameliorating some of the tension generated by the network of interpersonal authority relationships which make up the system of control. In this instance, by legitimating and impersonalizing authority and punishment, they make the exercise of control tolerable for all parties. Rules may also be used to protect the organization both from untoward actions of its members and from pressure from the public and other organizations.

Nevertheless, as we have noted in discussing the other patterns of control, in attempting to structure an organization so that it can rationally and predictably pursue certain specified goals, the groundwork is laid for dysfunction. Elements of dysfunction are thought to be a direct result of the attempt to delineate the authority and responsibility inherent in individual offices through a body of rules and to impersonalize relationships among members of the organization and between members and those persons outside of it with whom they come into official contact. If we now turn to an analysis of the functioning of rules within organizations, these manifest and latent effects become evident.

Rules as Bearers of Organizational Authority

As suggested by Weber, authority in modern organizations comes to reside in a body of formal, universal, impersonal rules which specify for the incumbent of an "office" his sphere of competence and define his jurisdiction. This means that the responsibility for accomplishing some subgoal of the organization is specified. However, the organization must provide the incumbent with the necessary tools to accomplish his goals. Consequently, the requisite authority and means of compulsion must be clearly defined and norms prescribed governing their use, and authority thus becomes embodied in a set of rules.

Weber's notion of viewing organizations in terms of the internal differentiation of authority in a clearly defined hierarchy of roles or offices suggests that any analysis of organizations must be concerned with authority as manifested in rules at each level of their structure. Officials exercise authority which is vested in rules and are subject to authority which resides in rules. Rules become the "bearers of authority" for the organization, and it is through them that an organization controls and directs the actions of its members as they attempt to reach a given goal.

The Directional Function of Rules. The first function that rules perform is that of direction. They operate as guidelines for behavior so that an individual can participate effectively as a member of an organization.⁴⁶ If behavior is to be oriented toward the achievement of organizational goals, it is necessary to specify obligations and delineate responsibility and authority. Rules, in this context, communicate to each employee the expectations of the administration. They structure not only action but also relationships of individuals with the organization. In this manner the organization becomes a collectivity of individuals working toward subgoals which are functionally different but which are all related in a systematic fashion to the achievement of the central goal.

In the case of the school, my contention is that, regardless of its formally stated goals, the determining factor is the contact of the

46. This general notion is discussed under the heading of the "explicational" function of rules in Gouldner, *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy*, pp. 162-64.

student and the teacher in the institutional framework of the classroom. The actual goals achieved by the school will depend almost entirely upon the behavior of the teacher and the nature of his contact with his students. As a result, the main control over the pursuit of its objectives that the administration has at its disposal is the enforcement of rules and standards for teachers. Rules and standards, then, determine the nature of the interaction between students and teachers and thus determine the actual goals of the school to a far greater extent than does any particular allocation of time to the various school activities.

Rules and the Decentralization of Authority. Where the nature of the work is such that supervision and control are difficult or undesirable, rules may be used to control behavior from a distance.⁴⁷ Once the rules are formally stated and generally known by members of the organization, they have a self-enforcing effect that reduces the need for supervision and direction in the day-to-day activities of the organization. Administrators can control operations in organizations where the work is geographically decentralized or where the formally structured channels of communication are not well developed. The school, in which teachers are physically separated in individual classrooms, where there are no reliable measures of their performance, and where channels of communication are difficult to establish, represents such an organization. Administrators then can control behavior by rules, with a series of occasional checks to determine that the rules are being obeyed.

The embodiment of authority in rules is given a further impetus by the absence, to date, of valid and reliable measures of teacher effectiveness.⁴⁸ Direct measures of performance in terms of teaching results have proved unsatisfactory, and attempts to factor out

47. For a discussion of what is termed the "remote control" function of rules, see *ibid.*, pp. 166-68; and Julian Franklin, "The Democratic Approach to Bureaucracy," *Readings in Culture, Personality and Society* (New York: Columbia College, n.d.), p. 3.

48. Two good summaries of evaluative techniques are A. S. Barr *et al.*, *Wisconsin Studies of the Measurement and Prediction of Teacher Effectiveness* (Madison, Wis.: Dembar Educational Research Services, 1961); and Dwight E. Beecher, *The Evaluation of Teaching: Backgrounds and Concepts* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1949).

a particular teacher's influence on a group of students so far have met with little success. As a result, it is difficult to define effective teaching or to determine who is a competent teacher or how effectively a teacher is fulfilling the aims of the school. These difficulties are further complicated by the school's vague, general functions, such as citizenship training, character formation, and the development of social skills. Here again, it has not been easy to determine the extent to which these goals are achieved or to evaluate different approaches and methods used in pursuit of them.

A consequence of this ambiguity is the vesting of authority in a set of rules prescribing the function of a teacher, rather than in the teacher himself. Instead of measuring teacher effectiveness, the administration can measure teacher conformity. In the minds of many administrators, unfortunately, conformity and effectiveness are synonymous.

Now it is possible to formulate a number of hypotheses concerning the development of bureaucratic rules within organizations by considering rules as both dependent and independent variables. First, it may be hypothesized that bureaucratic rules in organizations will vary inversely with the administration's perception of their members' competence. Where competence of personnel is questionable, one would expect an explicit statement of duties and obligations as the administration attempts to ensure that actions will be consonant with the goals of the organization. The same argument can be used in the case of commitment of subordinates. It can be hypothesized that bureaucratic rules will vary inversely with the degree of subordinates' perceived commitment.⁴⁹ A third hypothesis is that bureaucratic controls will vary inversely with the reliability of measures of performance. Because teacher behavior and competence, as well as accomplishment, are subjectively measured in the schools, it may be felt that performance can be indirectly measured by determining the degree of conformity to prescribed procedures.

Closely related to this hypothesis is another that relates controls to supervision: bureaucratic controls will vary inversely with the

49. For a study concerning the relevance of this hypothesis for a mining company, see Gouldner, *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy*, p. 180.

amount of supervision of subordinates.⁵⁰ In occupations such as teaching, in which it is difficult to supervise lower subordinates closely, it will be expected that management will attempt to control behavior from a distance by establishing rules. Thus rules will be expected to proliferate so that a spot-check system can be used to supervise employee behavior.

Another hypothesis is that bureaucratic controls will vary directly with the "routinizability" of tasks.⁵¹ Those organizational functions which are characterized as routine and repetitious are much more susceptible to regulation than those which are infrequent and which vary with the class and the teacher. Thus it would be expected that some functions would be more likely to be subject to rules and prescription than others. However, one would expect that attempts would be made to recognize common "routinizable" elements in all functions and to subject those elements, as far as possible, to prescription.

It is also hypothesized that bureaucratic controls will vary inversely with the specificity of organizational objectives.⁵² One may expect that, in the pursuit of objectives which are not clearly defined, the administration will resort to extensive prescription of behavior through rules in order to ensure that the action of subordinates is directed toward accomplishment of these goals. In those areas, such as character building or citizenship training, in which there is some uncertainty about what the teacher is expected to accomplish, one would expect the most thorough delineation of curriculum and instructional methods.

Finally, it is hypothesized that the larger the organization in terms of clientele and employees, the more bureaucratic the controls.⁵³ In many school districts whenever there are six or more

50. However, two studies have shown that the organization may resort to other forms of administration in place of bureaucratic control. See Stinchcombe, "Bureaucratic and Craft Administration of Production"; and Etzioni, "Authority Structure and Organizational Effectiveness."

51. For a study of this hypothesis in industry, see Richard H. Hall, "An Empirical Study of Bureaucratic Dimensions and Their Relation to Other Organizational Characteristics" (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1961). Part of his study is summarized in "Intraorganizational Structural Variation: Application of the Bureaucratic Model," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 7 (December, 1962):295-308.

52. *Ibid.*

53. *Ibid.*

teachers in a high school department a chairman is appointed with extra supervisory duties. This creates an additional level in the hierarchy.

Rules and the Displacement of Goals. An adverse result of the attempt to develop a highly predictable behavior is the routine performance of duties. The system of rules is so designed that a high degree of conformity and adherence to prescribed behavior develops, an emphasis which ultimately results in goal displacement.⁵⁴ Rules and procedures introduced as means for the accomplishment of ends become ends in themselves. Proper behavior becomes understood as rigid adherence to rules and conformity, regardless of the circumstances or the merits of the individual case. An overconcern with rules and regulations thus ultimately obscures primary goals.

In the school the career of the teacher is so designed as to reinforce such goal displacement. Incentives and transfers to a more desirable school or from junior to senior high school are largely dependent upon conformity with prescribed patterns of action. The probability of goal displacement increases as the teacher realizes the necessity for conservatism, adherence to standards, and acceptance of administration views. As mentioned earlier, a bureaucratic orientation, not a professional attitude, is what is rewarded. Rewards, promotion, and approbation are not bestowed in accordance with the professional expectations and values of the teachers themselves. Rather, they are made by superiors in accordance with what often appears to be bureaucratic orientation.

The energy of the teacher becomes directed toward maintaining vested interests, adhering to existing procedures, and resisting any innovation or change inimical to his status or interest. Teacher attention is focused on the procedure itself, and not on the purpose for which it was devised. This tendency is evidenced in opposition to such improvements as merit pay plans, the new mathematics and science programs, and team teaching. In some

54. For an illuminating discussion of the displacement of goals in bureaucratic organizations, see Robert K. Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality," *Social Forces*, 18 (May, 1940):560-68.

school systems teachers exert the strongest opposition to curriculum and technological changes.

Rules and Role Distortion. The distortion of the relationship between employees and clients may be another adverse result of bureaucratic controls. Such distortion arises out of the administration's need to ensure that its subordinates' actions are systematically directed toward accomplishing the objectives of the organization. To this end, rules and normative standards are developed. However, these standards may have a circular effect as compliance itself becomes the over-riding consideration in the interaction between employees and clients. This may lead to unanticipated consequences antithetical to the organization's objectives.

Examples of this effect are found in some urban public schools in which administrative norms require teachers to be primarily disciplinarians, at least in the perception of the students. Resentment and alienation of students and teachers may make it difficult to accomplish such central objectives of the school as teaching subject matter and formation of character.

Willard Waller foresaw this dilemma. On the one hand, motivating students to learn requires an affectionate relationship between student and teacher based on primary personal relations. On the other hand, enforcement of discipline and compliance require impersonal secondary relations and may engender a great deal of resentment. There may be an intrinsic incompatibility between teaching and the bureaucratic structure of the school, and the teacher, in order to fulfill his bureaucratic obligations, may be forced to abrogate his standards of effective teaching.⁵⁵

In addition, the teacher's primary role as a transmitter of a particular discipline is further submerged under the weight of institutional duties. These duties may absorb a large percentage of the time which could be devoted to teaching. The teacher may be cast in the secondary role of an employee, responsible for performing duties which appear to have little relevance to the primary goals of the school.

55. This notion of Waller's is discussed in Charles E. Bidwell, "The School as a Formal Organization," in *Handbook of Organizations*, pp. 972-1022. It is taken from Willard Waller, *The Sociology of Teaching* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1932).

From this it may be hypothesized that alienation between clients and employees will vary directly with bureaucratic rules. The more rigidly the teacher's behavior is controlled by prescription, the less able he will be to deal with the individual problems of his students.

Rules and the Reinforcement of Apathy. Another result of the rigid structuring of the roles of participants in an organization is to reinforce tendencies toward lack of commitment and motivation on the part of its members.⁵⁶ Once the functions of an office are specified, the minimum level of acceptable performance is defined, and this then becomes the standard. Rules and regulations not only define acceptable behavior but also indicate behavior which permits the individual to escape sanctions. In effect, they permit the employee to function in the organization by strict adherence to the rules and regulations without personal involvement and commitment.

Teachers, for example, need not be committed to education in a professional sense. Lesson plans can be prepared according to specifications. Prescribed curriculum guides can be rigidly followed. Grading procedures can be carried out exactly. But the teacher himself may still remain totally unconcerned as to the progress of his students and may make little or no effort beyond that which is required of him.

The end result is that bureaucratic controls intensify the problem that they are introduced to mitigate—lack of commitment and motivation. Attitudes are not modified and involvement is not increased. In a very real sense, controls beget additional controls, making it necessary to devise still other means of coping with the original problem. Participants become functionaries, simply exercising the authority vested in them by the rules. The vast reservoir of experience, skills, and knowledge, the product of the diverse backgrounds of the members of the organization, is left untapped. The originality, initiative, or the insight that comes with experience at a particular job is wasted.

56. For a good explanation of this effect of rules, see Gouldner, *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy*, pp. 174-80.

It has already been suggested that bureaucratic rules vary according to the manifestation of commitment on the part of employees. Now the reverse is suggested, namely, that commitment varies in inverse proportion to the number of bureaucratic rules. Thus one would expect bureaucratic rules and lack of commitment to reinforce each other.

Rules as Mediators of Authority Relationships

The superimposition of a division of labor upon a hierarchical authority structure creates the bureaucratic form of organization. Much of the organization's subsequent effort is expended in attempting to overcome the tensions and problems created by the interaction of these two systems.

As Victor Thompson has pointed out⁵⁷ the modern executive is increasingly dependent upon highly skilled specialists, a dependence that is greatest at the highest levels of the organization. The anxiety generated by this dependence, which violates status expectations, may be ameliorated somewhat by excessive reliance upon bureaucratic rules. However, as we shall see, this solution to tension and anxiety is not without an attendant cost to the organization in terms of impersonal treatment of clients, scrupulous adherence to rules and regulations, and avoidance of responsibility by subordinates.

The Impersonalizing Function of Rules. An additional role that rules play within an organization is that of an impersonalizing mechanism. In one sense rules serve as a "buffer" between the administrator and the subordinate.⁵⁸ By reducing the necessity for frequent contact between the two, rules, rather than the personal authority of direct supervision, influence the conduct of participants. Rules allow the administrator to call upon the organizational authority residing in them so that he does not have to legitimate his authority personally. On the other hand, they provide a means whereby employees can accept the organization's

57. Thompson, *Modern Organization*, pp. 81-113.

58. Gouldner discusses the mediating influence that rules have on the relationship between superiors and subordinates in terms of what he calls their "screening" function in *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy*, pp. 164-66.

claim to authority without personally submitting to administrators whom they view as their professional equals.

In a very real sense, then, authority resides in the rules, not in the members of the organization. The administrator is simply explicating the authority vested in the rules. The subordinate is simply obeying the authority residing in the rules. Both persons thus become agents, with the rules acting as the real bearer of authority.

In another sense, rules make institutional relationships predictable. They structure the lines of authority and the channels of communication within an organization. At each level authority resides in the rules surrounding each position. Thus the impact of any one individual on the functioning of the organization is minimized. The organization is an impersonal structure functioning in a predetermined manner. As Julian Franklin suggests, "the aim in organizing a bureaucratic structure is to narrow the area of discretion and, as far as possible, to reduce the process of administration to a series of routine actions."⁵⁹

Rules may be viewed also as protecting members of the organization from personal influences. A member knows what is expected of him and can and must have recourse to the rules for protection against such influences. Since the organizational authority does not reside in individuals but in rules, the entire structure is concerned with strict adherence to, and enforcement of these rules. Relationships are rigidly circumscribed as a result of this overriding consideration.

Robert K. Merton⁶⁰ has observed that within formal organizations conflict arises when personal relations are substituted for the impersonality required by the bureaucratic structure. Since the organized network of social relations is supported by secondary norms of impersonality, any intrusion of primary group attitudes causes conflict and generates claims of partiality, favoritism, and arbitrariness. These claims arise because the bureaucratic structure is designed to carry on activities which cannot be adequately performed on the basis of primary group norms.

59. Franklin, "The Democratic Approach to Bureaucracy," p. 3.

60. For an excellent discussion of the nature of pathological bureaucratic behavior, see Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality."

Rules and the Legitimation of Authority. As a result of the insecurity of administrators as to their authority over employees and employees' unwillingness to accept this authority, rules may also serve to legitimate authority. In education school principals and teachers have different areas of technical competence. Therefore, the principal does not feel competent to judge the teacher's effectiveness in matters pertaining to subject matter, and specialists supervise the technical aspects of the teacher's job. However, there are few, if any, reliable measures of teacher performance except direct, subjective observation by another person. Antagonism may also develop between teachers and supervisors because the teacher considers himself to be professionally equal to the supervisor. Thus the need to assert and legitimate authority arises. This legitimation is accomplished by embodying authority in rules.

The teacher thus has two conflicting sources of authority. One is the result of professional expectations and training and is characterized by self-determination and responsibility. Ideally, reliance on knowledge, skills, and attitudes acquired in the course of an extensive training program allows a group of professional norms to guide the teacher's behavior, and he then expects a large degree of autonomy in performing his function.⁶¹

The other source of authority is that embodied in the bureaucratic rules of the school. The teacher finds most elements of his role carefully specified, leaving him little or no professional autonomy. The school system does little to support his professional expectations. Good teachers, as defined by teachers themselves, are not rewarded, and poor teachers are not punished. School administrators do not turn to the teacher's professional association for standards of recruitment and promotion. The result is a conflict between the teacher's professional values and expectations and those of the bureaucratic administration. The danger is that teachers who find it impossible to realize their expectations will tend to abandon their professional orientation and will accept a more rewarding bureaucratic orientation.⁶² On the basis of this

61. For a commentary on professionalization in education, see Myron Lieberman, *Education as a Profession* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1956).

62. For a brief discussion of this conflict in authority, see Chandler Washburne, "The Teacher in the Authority System," *Journal of Educational Sociology*, 30 (May, 1957):390-94.

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relationship between superiors and subordinates, it is hypothesized that bureaucratic rules will vary inversely with the stability of the authority relationship between employees low in the hierarchy and administrators.⁶³

The Impersonal Treatment of Clients. Impersonalization arises out of the emphasis placed on formalized and impersonalized relationships.⁶⁴ In an attempt to minimize personal relations, abstract rules for classes are developed. The nature of the bureaucratic structure, in which authority is vested in a body of rules making up the official's office, demands that the individual case be ignored and that categories be developed into which each problem or individual is placed. Because persons outside of the organization represent an uncontrollable element which may prove disruptive, such categories also permit similar cases to be treated in a predetermined manner. Although they minimize the impact that outside influences may have on the operation of the organization and channel their expression in ways which will be discussed later, they also lead to conflict between the official, who views a case as fitting a particular stereotyped model, and the client, who wants personal consideration of his circumstances. In such a case an official can then call upon the authority and prestige of the organization, represented by its rules, to justify his actions with respect to his clients.

Rules and the Legitimation of Punishment. Punishment is made legitimate when employees are given express warning of the behavior that will provoke it as well as of the nature of the punishment to be inflicted. Concerning this function of rules, Gouldner has written: "Bureaucratic rules, then, serve to legitimate the utilization of punishments. They do so because the rules constitute statements in advance of expectations. As such, they comprise explicit

63. Gouldner suggests a hypothesis similar to this one where he finds that status distinctions of dubious legitimacy arise within a mining company. This may also be valid for the relationships between teachers and administrators in a school (*Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy*, p. 180). For a discussion of authority conflict in the schools, see Howard S. Becker, "The Teacher in the Authority System of the Public School," *Journal of Educational Sociology*, 27 (November, 1953):128-41.

64. For a discussion of conflict caused by impersonalization with clients, see Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality."

or implicit warnings concerning the kind of behavior which will provoke punishment."⁶⁵

This, in effect, impersonalizes the administration of punishment by a superior, who then does not have to justify it to his subordinate. He is simply enforcing the rules. By the same token, rules permit the subordinate to accept punishment without the loss of self-respect because he knows in advance the likely consequence of his actions. Punishment then becomes a disciplinary method acceptable to both administrator and subordinate. An example of the use of rules in this fashion in the school system is the provision for the withholding, at the end of the semester, of a teacher's pay check until his grades and reports are submitted.

The Bargaining Function of Rules. Rules can also be used by administrators as a means of bargaining with employees for their cooperation.⁶⁶ Once a punishment is established for a given behavior, the rule can either be enforced or ignored by the administrator. He can always call upon the authority of the organization to justify enforcement of the rules, but may then use his own discretion to justify relaxation of them.

Enforcement of rules may be made contingent upon acceptance of other prerogatives of the administrator by his subordinates. In the case of the schools, rules concerning the time that teachers must sign in and out may be used by the administrator to bargain for teacher acceptance of extra duties such as faculty meetings and committee work. Authority is viewed by both administrator and teacher as residing in the rules. The administrator may choose to uphold this authority or to ignore it. The teacher, also recognizing and accepting its legality, may tacitly concur in the administrator's judgment as to the necessity for strict interpretation of the rules and adherence to the authority which they embody.

Legalism. One result of the attempt to specify jurisdiction is legalism.⁶⁷ Rules and regulations are used to standardize proce-

65. Gouldner, *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy*, p. 170.

66. See Gouldner's discussion of the "leeway" function of rules in *ibid.*, pp. 172-74.

67. For a discussion of the development of legalism in the navy, see Arthur K. Davis, "Bureaucratic Patterns in the Navy Officer Corps," *Social Forces*, 27 (December, 1948):143-53.

dures and to fix responsibility and authority for each individual. This use of the rules also permits the administration to assign responsibility for and punish behavior that does not conform to the prescribed norms. In cases in which individuals are held responsible for failures and deviations, the defense of the individual lies in a strict application of the rules. In the face of outside pressures and demands, the employee defends himself by falling back on the total authority and prestige of the organization that resides in the official policies and rules. It is only reasonable that over a period of time, in the face of pressure from within and without the organization, as a defense mechanism members will begin to develop a legalistic and conformist attitude toward existing rules to an extent not anticipated when they were first formulated. The notion of doing one's duty, obeying the rules, allows one to abdicate one's own responsibility for consequences that may sometimes be adverse. Here it is hypothesized that legalism as manifested by adherence to formal rules will vary directly with the number and extent of the bureaucratic rules themselves.

Rules and the Avoidance of Responsibility. In a very real sense the teacher's responsibility exceeds his authority. Although he is responsible for the progress of his students and for their conduct and well-being while they are under his jurisdiction, he does not have the authority to control the wide range of social, personal, and technical factors that operate in and on the schools. Such factors have a decided bearing on whether or not the students do progress and the goals of the school are realized.

An example is provided by the teacher who is responsible for teaching a heterogeneous class consisting of students of low ability, students who pose disciplinary problems, and emotionally disturbed children. The teacher does not have the authority to control a whole host of variables that will seriously affect the progress of this group, yet he is responsible for demonstrating some progress with each child. He also lacks the specialized skill to deal with problems that may involve psychological and sociological factors in addition to those of content mastery and methodology.



The result is that the teacher tends to minimize responsibility in those instances in which no precedent exists for action.⁶⁸ He avoids problems that are difficult to solve by shifting responsibility upward to higher levels of the hierarchy. This discrepancy between authority and responsibility encourages the subordinate to seek prior approval of his plans from his superiors, rather than use his own judgment and initiative. Thus we have teachers who must secure prior approval before planning a field trip, a debate, or a demonstration, before assigning projects or deviating in any way from the normal instructional procedures. We find teachers who constantly refer slow learners and discipline cases to the counselor, to the department chairman, or to the vice-principal.

The tendency to shift responsibility is reinforced by the discrepancy between a teacher's effort and his reward. Since effective teaching performance is difficult to measure, rewards and promotions must be based on seniority and on the judgment of superiors to a greater extent than in other professions. A teacher concerned about his career will minimize his area of individual responsibility when there is any possibility of incurring the displeasure of his superiors. Minimizing responsibility is a way of protecting oneself and ensuring a favorable report by supervisors and principals. This behavior is especially noticeable during the probationary period but is also typical after the teacher has acquired tenure, particularly if he wants better school and class assignments.

Implicit in the delegation of authority to the teacher is the understanding that control and direction will be maintained from the point of delegation.⁶⁹ The subordinate is expected to furnish through some mechanism information on his performance, as a measure of his attainment of organizational goals, and to seek approval for actions not specifically covered in the rules defining his jurisdiction and official functions. In return, the superior is expected to evaluate his subordinates' performance, to recommend promotions, and to reward satisfactory behavior.

This phenomenon of avoidance of responsibility might also be viewed as an attempt to gain rewards and approbation on the part

68. *Ibid.*

69. Robert Dubin, "Upward Orientation toward Superiors," *Human Relations in Administration*, pp. 272-73.

of individuals low in the hierarchy. Because measures of achievement are lacking in teaching, the teacher may seek from his superiors something more than the intrinsic satisfaction associated with teaching students—recognition of his accomplishments. Thus it may be hypothesized that avoidance of responsibility by employees will vary in direct accordance with bureaucratic rules. One would expect a constant pressure for guidance to be exerted by subordinates on superiors, as evidenced by requests for instructions, prior approval of plans, and recommendations.

The Security Function of Rules. Finally, rules may serve a security function for employees low in the hierarchy. Employees tend to exhibit an “upward-looking posture” when forced to choose between exertion of initiative, with the possibility of failure, and obtaining approval, with the possibility of avoiding responsibility. The system is structured in such a way as to encourage such dependence. Robert Presthus points out that

it is not only *positions* that are ranked in terms of authority, but relative amounts of authority, status, deference, income, and other perquisites of office are ascribed to each position. Such perquisites are allocated disproportionately. They tend to cluster near the top and to decrease rapidly as one descends the hierarchy. This inequitable distribution of scarce values is characteristic of all big organizations; it provides a built-in condition of inequality and invidious differentiation. Hierarchical monopoly of the distribution system augments the power of those at the top since rewards can be allocated to reinforce elite definitions of “loyalty,” “competence,” and so on.⁷⁰

Conformity may be a means of reducing anxiety. Presthus⁷¹ discusses the “anxiety-conformity-approval syndrome” by which certain culturally defined patterns of behavior motivate human actions. He suggests that within organizations this syndrome guides individual behavior in interpersonal relationships on the basis of gradations of status and authority. An individual who conforms to rules, policies, and procedures laid down by superiors minimizes risk and reduces anxiety.

70. Presthus, *The Organizational Society*, p. 33.

71. *Ibid.*, pp. 93-134.

Rules and Informal Groups. A final dysfunctional force within organizations is the presence of informal groups as countervailing forces.⁷² Informal groups arise spontaneously within organizations and are based upon personal relationships. Usually they represent attempts to control the behavior of members of the group and the conditions under which they work. Once individual teachers realize the impossibility of personally modifying working conditions, promotional policies, and salary scales, they may conceive of themselves as members of a group which can, through cooperative action, exert pressure for standardization of certain behavior and policies—patterns of expression, status systems, and punishment and reward systems not provided for in the formal organizational structure—through rules. The attention of such groups is focused on the specific problems and goals that are relevant to the particular subdivision of the organization from which they spring.

Chester Barnard⁷³ was one of the first to discuss the functions of informal groups. First, they provide a communications system through which superiors and subordinates may establish informal norms of conduct. Second, through regulating motivation and stabilizing the formal authority system, they help to maintain a sense of self-respect and independence among employees, while at the same time maintaining the organization's prerogatives.

The depersonalization of relationships within an organization and the administration's view of employees as members of a common class as defined according to the rules has the consequence, therefore, of encouraging cooperative action.⁷⁴ If dissatisfaction is great enough, teacher unions and attempts at collective bargaining may be the agencies for this action. This notion is supported by the following findings of a British study of middle-class unions:

72. For a discussion of the functioning of informal groups within organizations, see Philip Selznick, "An Approach to a Theory of Bureaucracy," *American Sociological Review*, 8 (February, 1943):47-54.

73. For a discussion of informal organization as essential to formal organization, see Chester I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 114-23.

74. Robert Dubin, "Decision-Making by Management in Industrial Relations," *American Journal of Sociology*, 54 (January, 1949):292-97.

A social situation is created in which the worker's experience of the impersonality of the factory bureaucracy is widened and generalized into a sense of class division.

The same organization of factory production throws workmen together, physically and socially, and provides the prime basis for their collective action. Class identification is further promoted by the industrial emphasis upon standard conditions of work and skill which iron out individual differences within the work force. In this process the development of machine technology has played a major role. Equally important, however, have been the social relationships created by the labor market. The common identification of masses of individual workmen is facilitated by the evolution of universal standards of work which force the workmen in one factory to realize that their conditions are bound up with those of other workmen in physically separate units of production. In general, therefore, the social relations of the work situation, which on the one hand accentuate the physical separation of worker and management, in this instance unite workers, not only by reinforcing the physical concentration of the work force, but also by overcoming their physical separation.⁷⁵

Consequently, the informal group is oriented toward gaining control of that portion of the decision-making process relevant to its own personal goals. In decisions such as promotion, placement, and performance, the existing rules make it difficult for the individual to predict decisions. Through cooperative action he tries to influence those administrative actions and to control those environmental circumstances which concern him.

One can observe the operations of the informal group's reward and punishment system in the school. Teachers who do not conform to informal group norms may find themselves ostracized, and subtle pressure may be brought to bear on them, sometimes through the formal organizational structure. For example, the English department of one junior high school asked the principal to remove a biology class display from the school, ostensibly because of its misspelled words, but in reality as a measure of censure of the biology teacher.

However, once the teacher comes to accept the necessity of rules and attempts to modify them to his own advantage, perhaps

75. David Lockwood, *The Blackcoated Worker* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1958), p. 206.

through teacher unions,⁷⁶ the administration's perception of opposition and attempts at collective bargaining only reinforces its tendency to centralize control and to standardize behavior with rules.⁷⁷ When rules must be applied broadly and actions of participants have a wide range of consequences for all levels of the organization, less discretion is allowed at any intermediate level of the hierarchy and authority is centralized. The effect of this process is circular, and the result may be the creation of additional rules and patterns of action which circumscribe the teacher's behavior more completely than before.

On the basis of these observations it is suggested that bureaucratic rules and informal groups will reinforce each other and that the development and pervasiveness of informal groups will be a function of the rules within the formal framework of the organization.

Rules and the Preservation of Organizational Autonomy

Every organization is influenced by the environment in which it is located and must develop ways and means of adapting to the changing demands of this environment if it is to survive. The form of adaptation may dramatically alter the structure and/or the goals of the organization, as demonstrated by Philip Selznick's study of the TVA.⁷⁸ When confronted by strong opposition from local interests, the federal government co-opted representatives of these groups into the management of the TVA. As a result of their participation in policy decisions, the earlier objectives of the TVA were modified.

A study of school principals by Harold D. McDowell⁷⁹ indicates that the principal's role changes as the environment from which the school draws its students changes. Principals encourage

76. For a discussion of the characteristics of professional unions, see Bernard Goldstein, "Some Aspects of the Nature of Unionism among Salaried Professionals in Industry," *American Sociological Review*, 20 (April, 1955): 199-205.

77. See Gouldner, *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy*, for a study of the interaction of rules and informal groups.

78. Philip Selznick, *TVA and the Grass Roots*, University of California Publications in Culture and Society, vol. 3 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949).

79. Harold D. McDowell, "The Principal's Role in a Metropolitan School System" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1954).

parent participation in the school's activities when the children are largely drawn from middle-class homes but discourage such participation when the school's clientele is from the lower class. Burton Clark's study of adult education in California⁸⁰ also indicates how an organization can be affected by its environment. In this instance a policy that only classes with a certain minimum enrollment could be offered resulted in student dominance over professionals in determining the content of the academic program.

The public school represents a type of organization that exercises little or no control over its clientele. What is more important, however, is that its clientele has no control over its participation in the organization, unless, of course, it elects to attend private schools. Richard O. Carlson has identified two adaptive mechanisms developed in the public schools to deal with the problem of an unselected and, in many instances, an involuntary clientele.⁸¹ The first defense is to segregate students who pose problems for the school in certain courses and sections. The second is differential treatment in such matters as grades, discipline, curricula, etc.

In each of the studies described, the organization involved responded quite differently to the problem of adapting to environmental influences, with quite disparate results in terms of the organization's structure and goals. One defense mechanism that they possess in common, however, is the adoption of organizational rules that may shape the nature of the relationship between employees and the organization's clientele. This mechanism is discussed below.

The Boundary Function of Rules. Rules may also serve a boundary function.⁸² Herbert Simon has postulated that the way to control an individual's behavior within an organization is to specify for him the value and factual premises on which he

80. Burton R. Clark, *Adult Education in Transition: A Study of Institutional Insecurity*, University of California Publications in Sociology and Social Institutions, vol. 1, no. 2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956).

81. Richard O. Carlson, "Environmental Constraints and Organizational Consequences: The Public School and Its Clients," in *Behavioral Science and Educational Administration*, ed. Daniel E. Griffiths (Chicago: 63rd Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, 1964), pp. 262-76.

82. The idea of a discretion-narrowing function for rules is suggested by Franklin, "The Democratic Approach to Bureaucracy," p. 3.

must base his decisions.⁸³ His "scope of influence" and "scope of discretion" are dependent upon the types of decisions left to his discretion and those which are specified for him; thus they can be broadened or narrowed by broadening or narrowing the rules delimiting his behavior.

The scope permitted an individual may very well depend upon his superiors' perception of his competence and motivation, as well as upon the critical nature of his function. In the case of the schools, the importance of this boundary function may be the result of the importance of the activity involved, as well as of the danger of pressure from outside the organization—from parents, citizens' groups, the law, through lawsuits, and other sources. Rules may also be used to prevent an individual from broadening the scope of his influence by reinterpretation of the rules governing his behavior. This may be especially necessary where legal matters are concerned or where overlapping jurisdictions may be detrimental to the functioning of the organization.

In the schools decisions and actions by teachers may have serious repercussions at all levels of the organization. For example, if parents feel that their child is not getting the quality of education that they desire, if he has been severely disciplined, or if he has been injured on the premises of the school, they can take action through the PTA, the local newspaper, the school board, and the courts. The importance of rules serving a protective function is therefore evident.

Rules impersonalize relations with persons outside of the organization and protect its members from outside pressures and influences. They permit the official to call upon the authority and prestige of the entire organization to justify disputed actions. A teacher may represent himself as merely an agent of the school board, in which legal authority ultimately resides. In fact, the organization's rules may be so designed as to channel outside pressure and influence into certain acceptable means of expression and to minimize their impact on the operation of the organization. An example of this kind of rule is the school's requirement that

83. Herbert Simon, *Administrative Behavior* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1947), pp. 220-47.

parents must see their child's guidance counselor, the vice-principal, and his teacher, in that order, to express a grievance.

One hypothesis is that bureaucratic rules will have a direct relationship to the likelihood of outside pressure on organization members. Especially in the schools, in matters in which the organization may be subject to legal action, such as discipline, control of student behavior, and health and safety of students, it becomes imperative that employees be protected by specification of acceptable courses of action. Such rules may also be necessary when there is a disparity between the socioeconomic status of teachers and students. Because conflict is known to arise between persons of different cultural backgrounds and expectations, it may be necessary to prescribe behavior for teachers and students in various situations. This greater degree of control may also be useful to the school as a device to retain competent teachers in a teaching situation which is less than optimal.

It is clear, therefore, that the extent to which rules are used to protect employees from outside pressure depends upon the institution's relationship to outside resources. If there is heavy dependence on these resources, as in some private schools, such rules are minimized. One would expect the organization to reduce the possibility of conflict by ensuring adequate channels of communication from the outside to the members of the organization.

SUMMARY

We have seen that within organizations bureaucratic rules perform a function of communication. As bearers of authority they structure relationships and ensure action which is consonant with the organizational endeavor. However, rules may function in a circular fashion which is both functional and dysfunctional for the organization. For example, although the directional and boundary functions of rules may be called upon when employee commitment is weak, rules may reinforce apathy by defining the minimum acceptable standard. Gouldner, in his study of a mining company,⁸⁴ has identified just such an effect, which he calls the

84. Gouldner, *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy*.

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"apathy-preserving function" of rules. Through this mechanism rules perpetuate the very attitudes that they were established to remedy.

In addition, by focusing undue attention on norms of behavior and operating procedures, rules may inadvertently result in a means-ends inversion for the organization, causing unsatisfactory relationships with clients, inflexibility, and resistance to innovation. Moreover, rules may receive an additional impetus from the desire of subordinates to structure working conditions and relationships in a predictable fashion, creating a domino effect in which rules beget rules as management attempts to deal with informal groups.

It is essential for administrators to be aware of both the manifest and latent implications of bureaucratic constraints in order to direct action toward a common organizational goal, while at the same time avoiding many of the dysfunctional consequences that have been discussed here. Failure to appreciate this Janus-like character of rules (see Fig. 1) has resulted in authority conflict and latent dissatisfaction within many organizations.

Moreover, as I have attempted to demonstrate in this chapter, patterns of control are inextricably associated with the structure that the organization assumes in order to make and enforce effective decisions regarding the activities of participants; the nature of the interpersonal relationships that take place within the organization; the organization's response to the environment in which it exists; and the performance, attitudes, and personalities of its members. The critical variable affecting the human aspect of organizations, therefore, seems to be the institution's control structure, and significant improvements in organizational effectiveness and in the ability of individuals to fulfill their needs and expectations may be achieved by altering the manner in which organizations control their personnel.⁸⁵

This, then, is the organizational model that will be examined in subsequent chapters. Although, it is recognized that all four patterns of control are used to varying degrees and in different

85. See A. S. Tannenbaum, "Control in Organizations: Individual Adjustment and Organizational Performance," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 7 (1962):236-57, for a good discussion of this point.




FIGURE 1. THE JANUS-LIKE CHARACTER OF BUREAUCRATIC RULES

combinations within individual organizations and even at different levels within the same organization, this study will investigate only one form of control—bureaucratic rules.

Hypotheses formulated concerning the development, functioning, and impact of rules in formal organizations will be examined in terms of a particular organization, the public school, and the bureaucratic theory developed in this chapter will be appraised in the light of the findings.